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Viewing cable 06MANAGUA1429, AMBASSADORS SHARE ELECTION CONCERNS WITH A/S

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06MANAGUA1429**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
06MANAGUA1429	2006-06-30 16:35	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Managua

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4103/la-embusa-y-el-gabinete-de-ortega>
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<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4041/millones-de-dolares-sin-control-y-a-discrecion>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4040/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-venezuela-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx>
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006>
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu>

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6802
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0127
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI 0041
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0449
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 3675
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0085
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0204
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001429

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [KDEM](#) [NU](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADORS SHARE ELECTION CONCERNS WITH A/S
SHANNON

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

11. (C) Summary: A group of ambassadors resident in Nicaragua, most of whom are contributing funds to election efforts, shared their conviction with A/S Shannon on June 26 that a thorough international observation effort is necessary to prevent fraud during the November 5 national elections. The ambassadors are also concerned about fraud and governability after the elections. Spanish Ambassador Jaime Lacadena warned that FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega has a chance of winning in the first round of voting if one of the Liberal candidates does not concede in favor of the other before the elections. End Summary.

12. (U) On June 26, A/S Shannon, Senior Advisor Tamburri, Ambassador and Emboffs met with the ambassadors of Japan, Norway, Mexico, Spain, Finland and Germany to discuss the upcoming national elections in Nicaragua. The following is a summary of their comments:

13. (C) GERMANY (Amb. Gregor Koebel): Germany's interests coincide with those of the USG) the Government of Germany prefers to spend taxpayers, money efficiently and this can not happen with the kind of rampant official corruption that has plagued Nicaragua. Regarding the elections, Germany is concerned about the possible (politically motivated) exclusion of candidates.

14. (C) MEXICO (Amb. Columba Calvo): Mexico supports President Bolanos in his fight against corruption and shares technical, scientific and cultural cooperation with Nicaragua. Mexico would like to see transparent elections and believes that the OAS mission, and the observation effort generally, are very important to minimize fraud on election day.

15. (C) JAPAN (Amb. Mitsuhiro Kagame): The FSLN and PLC are very strong in rural areas) one should not be deceived by the level of support for the dissident candidates evident in Managua. Eduardo Montealegre and Herty Lewites must organize their party structures in rural areas. Japan recently contributed \$61,000 to the Democracy Center to promote voting among young people, a key demographic in Nicaragua.

16. (C) NORWAY (Amb. Kirsten Christensen): Norway desires clear and transparent elections, so the Government of Norway

has provided funds to support the OAS observation mission and local observers under Etica y Transparencia. Christensen agreed with Ambassador Kagami, but remarked that the ALN is growing throughout Nicaragua. Christensen observed that, despite the ambassadors' private personal preferences, the direct endorsement of any candidate could be the kiss of death.⁸

¶17. (C) SPAIN (Amb. Jaime Lacadena): Spain maintains very significant interests in Latin America. Lacadena stated that he maintains his personal preferences regarding the elections, but Spain will remain publicly neutral. The Government of Spain is very concerned about governability after the elections. President Bolanos has very honorable intentions, but the lack of legislative support has handicapped his administration, he remarked.

¶18. (C) Lacadena believes that the FSLN can capture 35-38 percent of the vote, and could possibly add 2-3 percent more through fraud to avoid a runoff election. The FSLN vote is very disciplined, he asserted. Lewites will only take five percent of the Sandinista vote, plus six to eight percent of the independent vote. Montealegre and Rizo will divide the 50 percent that remain unless one of them renounces in favor of the other. Lacadena remarked that even if Montealegre wins, he may be burning too many bridges with the PLC to be able to form a unified Liberal block of deputies in the National Assembly after the elections. In any event, he believes the candidates will need to make concessions to govern.

¶19. (C) FINLAND (Amb. Marja Luoto): Finland will head the EU in July through the end of the year. The Finnish President is personally interested in Nicaragua and has visited the country eight times. The Government of Finland is concerned

what an Ortega presidency would mean for the EU's efforts to develop a free trade area with Central America as the EU is not interested in negotiating with the countries individually. Luoto stated that some of her contacts believe enough FSLN leaders have business interests so that Ortega would not radically alter economic policy, but she is unconvinced. Finland is also concerned about governability. Luoto commented that the war between the Executive and the National Assembly has made doing business very difficult for the donors.

¶10. (C) A/S Shannon responded that the USG understands that the direct endorsement of a particular candidate would be counterproductive. He clarified that although many in the PLC still believe that the USG will make amends with convicted PLC leader Arnoldo Aleman to prevent an Ortega victory, for us Aleman is as much a problem as Ortega. A/S Shannon stated that the USG will acknowledge the results of a fair and transparent election, but we will not do business with corrupt politicians.

¶11. (C) Comment: Lacadena may be overestimating the strength of the FSLN "hard core" vote, which a recent poll indicated was only 20 percent, and post estimates is at about 25 percent. Lewites supporters consistently claim that they will win 20-25 percent of the Sandinista vote, although Lewites' support seems to be largely concentrated in the central Pacific region.

¶12. (U) Participants, U.S.:

WHA A/S Thomas Shannon
Ambassador Paul Trivelli
Senior Advisor Maria Tamburri
DCM Peter Brennan
Polcouns Victoria Alvarado
Poloff Timothy Smith (notetaker)
TRIVELLI